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I. INTRODUCTION

Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications. By
now, these companies are household names - but not because of their products
or the services that they provide. They are household names because of their
involvement in the scandals that have recently rocked the corporate and investment world. The scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia
Communications, and other companies caused the trust that consumers and investors had in corporations, CEOs, and employees to take a downward plunge.
When choosing investments, investors rely on a company's reputation as well as
the "research, knowledge, and savvy of their brokers."' 1 However, "[u]ltimately,
1

Ethan G. Zelizer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Accountingfor CorporateCorruption?,15 LoY.
CONSUM R L. REv. 27, 27 (2002).
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and until now perhaps unknowingly, investors depend on independent auditors
to practice honest accounting." 2 This trust in the reputation of companies,
stockbrokers, and independent auditors led to the loss of millions of dollars for
investors when the stock prices of the companies fell.
While there is no simple answer to what caused the demise of these
companies, Senator Paul Sarbanes, one of the leading forces behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, has possible explanations. 3 These explanations include "a
lack of accounting autonomy, blurring the line between auditor and employee,
and a lack of executive responsibility and accountability. ' 4 Essentially, investors' trust had been misplaced, and accountants had "cooked the books." 5 Even
more disconcerting is that many of the scandals occurred with the knowledge
and help of company employees and corporate executives - and perhaps even
corporate attorneys.
Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") have
since made efforts to enact legislation to not only restore that trust but also to
restore the standards of honesty and corporate responsibility in companies
across the United States. These efforts resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
("Act"), and the SEC was charged with enforcement of the Act. In seeking to
rebuild the confidence of investors, customers, and people in both America and
abroad, the Act imposes new regulations on corporations and their employees.
Under Section 307, the Act specifically targets the actions of attorneys.
Why was this Act necessary and how did problems go unnoticed for so
long? This Comment focuses on Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
endeavors to assess the implications of the rules and demonstrate what this legislation could mean for the future of corporate attorneys.
First, this Comment will give a brief background of what happened with
Enron and other companies and the action taken by Congress and the SEC.
Then, the Comment will examine Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, explaining the comments that were given to the SEC when it published the proposed rules, the regulations of Section 307 themselves, and the penalties for
attorneys under Section 307. Next, it examines the arguments for Section 307
2

Id. at 27-28.

3

Id. at 32.

4

Id. (citing Senator Sarbanes at H.R. Rep. No. 107-414, at 18 (2002)).
Ild. at 34.

When accountants "cook the books," the accountants make profits within the

company's books appear to be higher than they actually are.
6
Because a thorough discussion would be outside the scope of this paper, this comment will
only briefly describe the penalties for attorneys under Section 307. For a more in-depth discussion, see generally Chi Soo Kim and Elizabeth Laffitte, The PotentialEffects of SEC Regulation
of Attorney Conduct Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 707 (2003); The
Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the CorporateAttorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:
Panel 2: The Evolution of Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 613, 621 (2003); David J.
Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules Governing the
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and the problems with the enactment of Section 307. Within the assessment of
the problems will be an explanation of the issues concerning the attorney-client
privilege. Finally, the Comment will draw conclusions on the implications that
the Act will have for corporate attorneys in the future. After discussing all of
these issues surrounding Section 307 of the Act, it will be clear that while many
of the provisions may prevent some potential future corporate scandals, the Act
may lead to more problems than it was created to solve.
The Crash HeardAround the World- The FallofEnron and Other Corporations

A.

"Enron is one of the world's leading energy, commodities and services
companies."'7 It divides its business into three areas: Wholesale Services, Energy Services, and Global Assets. 8 The company was initially formed in 1985
due to 9a merger between Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth of Omaha, Nebraska.
In 15 years, Enron grew from an unknown corporation into America's
seventh largest employer10 and boasted honors that included Fortune magazine's
Most Innovative Company in America for six years, top quartile of Fortune
Magazine's 100 Best Companies to Work For, and the All Star List of Global

Most Admired Companies.I1 Outwardly, the firm seemed to be profitable and
growing - an image which soon proved to be a mirage; Enron's statements
about its profits were lies. 2 For example, in late 2000, Enron's stock was trading at about $90 per share. 13 By late November 2001, Enron's credit rating had
changed from investment-grade to junk, and it had $3.9 billion in debt.' 4 At this
time, its shares had fallen to a price of $4.01 per share, and then two days later,

Conduct of Lawyers RepresentingPublic Corporations?,34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 873 (2003).

Enron Corporate Homepage, Company Snapshot, at http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/
factsheets/ (last visited January 25, 2004).
8
Id.

7

9

Id.

Corporate Social Responsibility: News and Resources, Corporate Social Responsibility Companies in the New: Enron, at http://www.mattenbaker.net/csr/CSRfiles/enron.html (last visited January 11, 2004).
10

it

Id.
Id. ("The firm projected itself as a highly profitable, growing company - an image which
quickly turned out to be an elaborate mistruth. Enron's statements about profits were shown to be
untrue, with massive debts concealed so that they didn't show up in the company's accounts.").
13
Zelizer, supra note 1,at 29.
12

14

Id.
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on November 28, the price fell below $1.15 Shortly after, Enron filed for bankruptcy.1 6 The collapse of the company came in December 2001 amid allegations of accounting fraud, shadow deals, and mismanagement of funds; the es-8
7
timated damage was around $100 billion.' Enron had "cooked the books,"'1
and it would not be the last company to do so.
In April of 2002, WorldCom, a communication services company, 19 announced that it was going to layoff 7,500 employees and cut revenue projections
by almost $1 billion. In June, it cut another 20% of its workforce and sold its
wireless unit.2 1 By the end of June, WorldCom stock dropped to under $1 per
share, and the cause of this drop was disclosed - "it failed to report $3.8 billion
in losses the previous year, effectively turning five quarters of losses into a
profit."'22 "Analysts estimate that the decline in consumer confidence caused by
the fall of the company resulted in shareholder losses of more than $2 trillion,
while 23more than half a million telecom-related industry employees lost their
'
jobs."
Other companies suffered similar fates. Global Crossings' financial
misstatements caused over 9,000 employees to be laid off and a pension fund
loss of over $66 million. 24 The pension funds of Rite Aid employees shrank as
inthe company lost $145 million. 25 Tyco International's top executives were
26
months.
five
in
80%
dropped
stock
the
while
fraud
accounting
dicted for

15

Timeline: Enron's Rise and Fall. BBC NEWS (February 4, 2002), at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/eng

lish/business/newsid_ 1759000/1759599.stm.
16

Zelizer, supranote 1, at 29.

17

Id.

18

Id. at 34. Enron used gross value instead of net value when it calculated its profits from

contracts. It sold the same product repeatedly but included the full value of the product in revenue
every time. Company executives created fake buyers to continue the appearance of the company's
revenue. Id. at 34-35.
19 MCI Homepage, About MCI, at http://www.mci.com/about/index.jsp (last visited January
25, 2004).
20
Zelizer, supranote 1 at 30.
21

Id.

22

Id. WorldCom stock had been priced as high as S64.50 in June 1999. Associated Press,

Judge OKs Independent Examinerfor WorldCom, HOLLAND SENTINEL ONLINE, July 23, 2002, at
www.hollandsentinel.com/stories/072302/new072302033.shtjnl.
23
Zelizer, supranote 1, at 30.
24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.at 31.
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In a Loyola Consumer Law Review article, Ethan Zelizer accurately
states: "[i]nvestors are helpless without reliable information."'27 Because of, and
perhaps thanks to, the scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossings, and
other corporations, investors and the government learned that these and other
corporations were deceiving them, and it was no longer safe to place trust in the
hands of the corporations who could abuse it so easily. These scandals, and the
problems they caused, left Congress little choice but to promulgate legislation
that would prevent future problems of this kind.
B.

Congress and the SEC Take Action

For nearly seventy years before the Enron scandal, securities laws provided several precautionary measures, including:
(1) standardized rules governing corporate disclosures; (2) SEC
reviews of corporate disclosures for accuracy, completeness,
and compliance with accounting rules; (3) collections by credit
rating agencies of as much information as possible to determine
the creditworthiness of companies; (4) the creation of audit
committees, made up of individual board members, to supervise
audits; and (5) independent auditor
to review and approve every
28
statements.
financial
company's
However, these measures were not enough because they failed to inform anyone
of the true financial state of Enron or the other companies;29 no one foresaw the
problems that were in the near future.
The board of directors of these companies did not question the accounting practices, and the SEC had no reason to question the seemingly normal audit
reports from top-notch accounting firms; thus, "the system was subject to
abuse. 3 This resulted in financial statements and annual reports failing to
show how corporations made their profits, 31 and credit agencies
continued to
32
issue more favorable ratings than these companies deserved.
27

Id. at 32.

28

Id. at 32-33. These laws include: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. 77, Securities Ex-

change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78; Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80-b; Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. 78aaa to 78fff, 78fff-I to 78fff-4, 78ggg to 78111; National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. 77z-3, 78mm, 80b-3a; and SEC
rules. Id. at 33 n. 36.
29
Id. at 33.
30

Id.

31

Id. at 35.

32

Id. at 33.
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Once the situation got out of hand, Congress and the SEC developed
plans to prevent further abuse of the system. After the collapse of Enron in December 2001, Representative Michael Oxley from Ohio began drafting a House
version of the corporate-governance bill.33 On April 24, 2002, the House of
Representatives approved
..... House Bill 3763, the Corporate34 and Auditing Acand Transparency Act of 2002. On July 15, 2002,
Responsibility,
countability,
the Senate approved Senate Bill 2673, the Public Company Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection Act of 2002. 35 When deciding on the compromised
version, the conference committee decided to keep most of the Senate provisions, which eventually became the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.36 Originally, neither
bill included a provision that would regulate attorneys, but hours before the
Senate approved the bill, several Senators added the text of Section 307, Rules
Responsibility for Attorneys, to the Senate bill as an amendof Professional
37
ment.
When Senator John Edwards of North Carolina introduced the amendment that eventually formed the basis of Section 307 in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
he gave a speech to the Senate in support of the proposed amendment. 38 In his
speech, he informed the Senate that he believed that the bill had forgotten about
an important "player" in the corporate scandals. 39 That "player" was the corpo",Oneof the problems we have seen occurring with this sort of
rate attorney.
crisis in corporate misconduct,' Senator Edwards lamented, 'is that some lawyers have forgotten their responsibility. "Al With that said, the corporate attorney was pulled into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act through the creation of Section 307,
entitled Rules of Professional Responsibilities for Attorneys.
II. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, SECTION 307
On July 30, 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because
corporations failed to "effectively police and enforce their existing policies and
33

Jennifer Wheeler, Securities Law: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Irreconcilable
Conflict with the ABA's Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 56 OKLA.
L. REv. 461, 464 (2003).
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 465.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id.
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otherwise ensure good corporate governance." ' 42 The purpose of the Act is to
"protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes." 43 The Act
applies to "all companies who are required to file reports with the Securities and
Section 307 of the Act deals specifically with attorExchange Commission.'
neys. This section:
mandates that the [Securities and Exchange] Commission issue
rules prescribing minimum standards of professional conduct
for attorneys appearing and practicing before it in any way in
the representation of issuers, including at a minimum a rule requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation
by the issuer or any agent thereof to appropriate officers within
the issuer and, thereafter, to the highest authority within the issuer, if the initial report does not result in an appropriate re45
sponse.
Before examining the language of the final rules, it is necessary to discuss the proposed rules that the SEC released before it promulgated the final
rules.
42

Andrew B. Cripe, Employee and DirectorAccountability to Shareholders: Doing Business

for Business Owners, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 153, 156 (2003).
43

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (HR 3763).

44
Thomas W. White, New US CorporateReform Law: Impact of the New US CorporateReform Law on Companies Whose Shares Trade in the US Securities Markets; US; Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Corporate Finance, Sept. 1, 2002, at S26.
45
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003 SEC LEXIS 256, at *2 (Jan. 29, 2003). Section 307 actually states:
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act") (15 U.S.C. 7245)
mandates that the Commission: shall issue rules, in the public interest and for
the protection of investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional
conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any
way in the representation of issuers, including a rule (1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any
agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive offers of the
company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors . . . comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
Id. at *3 n. 1; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002).
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The Debate Begins - Comments on the ProposedRules

A.

Before it decided on the final regulations, the SEC asked for and received many comments on the proposed release.4 6 On November 21, 2002, the
SEC published for comment proposed Part 205 - "Standards of Professional

Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing before the Commission in the
Representation of an Issuer. ''47 After the period for comment had expired, the

SEC announced its final rule. The adopted final rule differed in certain respects
to the original proposal.

48

For example, "the triggering standard for reporting

evidence of a material violation [was] modified to clarify and confirm that an
attorney's actions will be evaluated against an objective standard; ' 49 the documentation requirements for attorneys and issuers were removed; 50 and the SEC
added a "safe harbor" provision 51 that will protect issuers, officers and directors

of issuers, attorneys, and law firms. 52 The Commission also decided to extend
period on the "noisy withdrawal" provision; it has yet to be
the comment
53
adopted.

When the SEC provided the proposed rules for discussion, many of the
comments voiced opposition to Section 307. Several commentators feared that
such a rule would undermine the relationship and trust between attorneys and

corporations and that the provision went against the rules of professional conduct in certain jurisdictions. 54 Commentators who supported this provision
46

Id. at *4-5.

47

Id. at *4.

48

See generally id. (explaining proposed rules, proposed rules that have been withdrawn, and

comments on the proposed rules).
49

Id. at *6.

so

Id.

51

Id. at *134.

Under the safe harbor provision, Part 205 does not create a private cause of

action against an attorney, a law firm or an issuer, based upon their compliance or non-compliance
with the part. The Commission is of the view that the protection of this provision should extend
to any entity that might be compelled to take action under this part; thus, it extends to law firms
and issuers.
52
Id.
53

Id. at *7. Under the noisy withdrawal provision, if an attorney withdraws from representation of a client after failing to receive an appropriate response to potential evidence of a material
violation, the client is required to notify the Commission of the attorney's withdrawal as a "material event." Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities and
Exchange Commission, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
54

Id. at *102. For example, several comments stated that permitting attorneys to disclose
illegal acts to the Commission, in the situations delineated by the proposed rule, would undermine
the relationship of trust and confidence between the lawyer and client, and may impede the ability
of lawyers to steer their clients away from unlawful acts. Other comments expressed concern that
this provision conflicts with, and would (in their eyes impermissibly) preempt, the rules ofprofes-
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stated that many of the states allow or require such disclosures. 55 These commentators believed that this rule should "preempt any state ethics rule that does
not permit disclosure." 56 Therefore, supporters of Section 307 believe that
when the SEC regulations conflict with a particular state ethics rule, the SEC
regulations should supersede the state rule.
In answering the concerns of some of the commentators, the SEC stated
that "the vast majority of states already permit (and some even require) disclosure of information in the limited situations covered by this [provision] and the
Commission has seen no evidence that those already-existing disclosure obligations have undermined the attorney-client relationship." '57 The SEC went further and responded to the comments that expressed concern that this provision
would preempt state law ethics rules. The SEC referred commentators to Section 205.1 of the proposed regulation, which clearly stated that "Part 205 supplements state ethics rules and is not intended to limit the ability of any jurisdiction to impose higher obligations upon an attorney .... ,,58 The final rule
handed down by the SEC states:
[T]his part does not preempt ethical rules in United States jurisdictions that establish more rigorous obligations than imposed
by this part. At the same time, the Commission reaffirms that
its rules shall prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent laws
of a state or other United States
jurisdiction in which an attor59
ney is admitted or practices.

sional conduct of certain jurisdictions (such as the District of Columbia) which bar the disclosure
of information which an attorney is permitted to disclose under this paragraph, particularly where
it permits the disclosure of past client misconduct. Some aver that "it is not a lawyer's job" in
representing an issuer before the Commission "to correct or rectify the consequences of [the issuer's] illegal actions, or even to prevent wrong-doing." Comments of Joseph T. McLaughlin,
Heller Ehrman, at 2; Comments of the Los Angeles County ar Association, at 2; Comments of
Eleven Persons or Law Firms, at 8-9; Comments of the American Bar Association, at 33; Comments of 77 law firms, at 2; Comments of Latham & Watkins, at 5-6; Comments of Theodore
Sonde, at 2; Comments of Schiff Hardin & Waite, at 7-8; Comments of Sheldon M. Jaffe, at 7-9;

Comments of Emerson Electric, at 2; Comments of the Federal Bar Council, at 9-10 & n.9; Comments of JP Morgan & Chase, at 11 & n.3; Comments of the Law Society of England and Wales,
at 12.
55 Id.at *105. "At least four-fifths of the states now permit or require such disclosures as
pertain to ongoing conduct." Comments of Morrison & Foerster and eight other law firms; Edward C. Brewer, III, at 8.
56 Id. at * 105-06. Comments of Susan P. Koniak et al., 27, 31-32.

57

Id. at * 109 (notes deleted). For more discussion on attorney-client privileges, see infra Part

IV(A).
58

Id. at*l10.

59

Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities and Ex-
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Thus, Section 307 will not preempt any ethical rules that have stricter rules than

the section, but if there is any conflict between a state ethical rule and Section
307, then Section 307 will prevail.

The primary controversy in the proposed rules concerned the "noisy
withdrawal" provision. "Under certain circumstances, [the] provisions permitted or required attorneys to effect a so-called 'noisy withdrawal' by notifying

the Commission that they have withdrawn from the representation of the issuer,
and permitted attorneys to report evidence of material violations to the Commission." 60 This would create a requirement upon attorneys to "report out" to the
SEC if the material violation was not taken care of through the "reporting up"

procedure. The Commission believed it was important to assess the Section 307
rules requiring attorney withdrawal and that the attorney give notice to the
Commission when the corporate officers and directors failed to respond to violations that were reported to them.6 1 However, a debate broke out over this par-

ticular proposed provision in Section 307. While the SEC decided not to adopt
the "noisy withdrawal" provision, it viewed this provision as important, thus it
decided to extend the comment period on "noisy withdrawal" and asked for
suggestions on a proposed alternative to the provision. 62 The SEC did go for-

ward with publishing its final rules on the other provisions.
B.

The Sarbanes-OxleyAct
The effective date of the final rules was August 5, 2003. When the final

rules came out, Section 307 remained the section that covered attorneys, but
Section 307 is labeled as Part 205 in the Federal Register.
First, Section 205.3(b) of the final rule of the Act, entitled Implementa-

tion of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, states that when an
attorney is representing an issuer, the attorney has a duty to "report evidence of
a material violation." 63 Section 205.3(b)(1) further states:
change Commission 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6296-97 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205).
60
Id. at 6296.
61

Id. at 6297.

62

Id. The alternative provision states: "Under this proposed alternative, in the event that an

attorney withdraws from representation of an issuer after failing to receive an appropriate response
to reported evidence of a material violation, the issuer would be required to disclose its counsel's
withdrawal to the Commission as a material event." Id.
63

Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities and Ex-

change Commission, 68 Fed Reg. 6296. 6305 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
A "material violation" is not specifically defined in the proposed rules or in the final rules. In
fact, Professor Karmel, Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School, stated in a panel: "I don't
know what's a material violation and what's not a material violation of the securities laws. In
fact, the word 'materiality' is used throughout the securities laws. It's usually a disclosure threshold." The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the CorporateAttorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley
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If an attorney, appearing and practicing before the Commission
in the representation of an issuer, becomes aware of evidence of
a material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director,
employee, or agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such
evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal officer and its chief
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) forthwith. By
communicating such information to the issuer's officers or directors, an attorney does not reveal client confidences or secrets
or privileged or otherwise protected information related to the
attorney's representation of an issuer. 64
There are further requirements for the chief legal officer. Section 205.3(b)(2)
states:
The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) shall cause
such inquiry into the evidence of a material violation as he or
she reasonably believes is appropriate to determine whether the
material violation described in the report has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. If the chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof) determines no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall notify
the reporting attorney and advise the reporting attorney of the
basis for such determination. Unless the chief legal officer (or
the equivalent thereof) reasonably believes that no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she
shall take all reasonable steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate65 response, and shall advise the reporting attorney
thereof.

Additionally, if the corporation has established a qualified legal committee, then
the chief legal officer has the option of reporting
the evidence of the material
66
violation to the qualified legal committee.
The rules also give additional steps that attorneys must take in reporting
material violations in 205.3(b)(3). If an attorney does not believe that the chief
legal officer or chief executive officer has appropriately responded to the material violation within a reasonable amount of time, the attorney must report the
Act of 2002: Panel 2: The Evolution of Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 613, 622
(2003).
64

Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities and Exchange Commission, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6305 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
65
Id. at 6307.
66

Id.
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material violation to "the audit committee of the issuer's board of directors;"
"[a]nother committee of the issuer's board of directors consisting solely of directors who are not employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer and are not, in
the case of a registered investment company, 'interested persons;"' or "the issuer's board of directors." 67 Furthermore, pursuant to 205.3(b)(4), "[i]f an attorney reasonably believes that it would be futile to report evidence of a material
violation to the issuer's chief legal officer and chief executive officer ... the
attorney may report such evidence" to the audit committee,
a qualified legal
68
compliance committee (QLCC), or the board of directors.
The rules also state that having an attorney investigate possible material
violations does not relieve an officer or director of a corporation from a duty to
respond to the attorney. 69 Thus, these provisions require the attorney to continue reporting up the ladder until some action is taken in connection with the
material violation.
The above rules, all related to "reporting up," are not as controversial as
many of the other provisions and are not provisions with which some attorneys
and non-attorneys will disagree because it is clear that there needs to be some
procedure for reporting
potential violations and preventing cover-ups of poten70
violations.
tial
Section 205.3(d)(2) states:
An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in
the representation of an issuer may reveal to the Commission,
without the issuer's consent, confidential information related to
the representation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes
necessary:

67

Id. at 6307.

68

Id. at 6307-08.

69

Id. at 6308.

70

Both the arguments for and against the provisions will be discussed later in Part III and IV

in this comment. For more information concerning these arguments, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1293 (2003);
Panel 2, The Evolution of Corporate Governance, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 613 (2003); Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L_ REV.
1236 (2003); Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson's Choice for Securities Lawyers in the Post-Enron
Environment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91 (2002); Darlene M. Robertson & Anthony R. Tortora, Reporting Requirementsfor Lawyers Under Sarbanes-Oxley: Has Congress Really Changed Anything?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 785 (2003); Mark S. Dodge, Do You Have the Guts to Resign?,
CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2003, at 68; Alison Frankel, Feature; Changingthe Role ofAttorney From Zealous Advocate to ParanoidWatchdog is No Way to Improve Corporate Governance,
AvERICAN LAWYER (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Panel2]; Melissa Nann, 'Reporting-Up'Procedures
Under Sarbanes-Oxley Urged, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 19, 2003, *3.
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(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or
administrative proceeding from committing perjury . . .; suborning perjury... ; or committing any act.., that is likely to
perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the
issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors7 1in the furtherance of which the attorney's services were used.
This section allows the attorney to disclose certain confidences related to appearing and practicing before the SEC when representing the corporation; how72
ever, it does not require the attorney to disclose the confidential information.
The next step after knowing what the rules are under Section 307 is discovering how the SEC will enforce these regulations for scandals that occur post
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. What will happen to attorneys who
do not follow the guidelines and provisions of Section 307?
C.

Penaltiesfor Attorneys Under Section 307

Violating Section 307 will subject an attorney to civil penalties, but the
rules do not allow for private actions against an attorney; only the SEC may
bring an action against violating attorneys. 73 While the attorney can be subjected to disciplinary action by the SEC, the attorney will not be subjected to
such an action if the attorney complies with the SEC rule in good faith. 7 4 The
SEC can 'deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or prac75
ticing before it in any way' for unethical conduct or securities law violation."
In fact, there is a chance that
the SEC could not only bar an attorney from prac76
tice but also impose a fine.
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities and Exchange Commission, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6310 (2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205).
71
72

Id. This provision concerns an attorney-client privileges issue that will be discussed infra,

Part IVA.
Chi Soo Kim & Elizabeth Laffitte, The Potential Effects of SEC Regulation of Attorney
Conduct Under the Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 16 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHics 707, 719 (2003).
73
74

Id. at 719-20.

75

Id. at 725.

76

See Panel 2, supra note 70, at 633.
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While there is no private civil liability, Professor Richard Painter, a Professor of Law at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign School of Law,
believes there may still be liability exposure for an attorney. 77 "[W]here you
run into liability is when the company goes bankrupt, and you've got a trustee in
there who looks around for people who breached their duty to the company.
negligent."78 Thus, he
Those are just malpractice actions alleging that you were
79
exposure."
liability
is
believes that "absolutely, there
However, even with these options, in the past the SEC has been reluctant to sanction attorneys, preferring instead to leave the regulation of attorney
conduct to state bars. 80 In the aftermath of Enron and other corporate scandals
and with the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley, it remains to be seen whether
the SEC will continue to leave regulation to state bars, or if it will choose to
play a larger role in regulating and reprimanding attorney conduct.
The Comment next discusses the arguments in favor of Section 307.
Following the argument in favor will be a discussion of the problems that arise
from the implementation of Section 307, where the Comment will give more
consideration to the attomey-client privilege and other criticisms that have been
leveled against Section 307.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR SECTION 307

The support for regulations pertaining to lawyers stems from a belief
that the rules will hold corporate attorneys to a higher standard of ethical conduct and make them more accountable for the actions of their corporate clients.
This accountability is what some argue is necessary to prevent another round of
corporate scandals. 81 For supporters of the rules, prevention is the key, and they
conduct have
have argued that, up until now, existing regulations on attorney
82
needed.
is
standards
of
set
uniform
a
and
unsuccessful
been
When these proponents of a uniform set of standards succeeded and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed with Section 307, it started a dialogue between
the supporters and the opponents of the Act, and both the pros and cons of the
Section were discussed and evaluated. This section of the Comment focuses on
the arguments in favor of Section 307.
Supporters of Section 307 believe that prior to the Act, lawyers were not
required by federal securities law to report any violations or fraud committed by
77

Id.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Kim & Laffitte, supra note 73, at 725.

81

See generally Robertson & Tortora, supra note 70.

82

Id. at 786.
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corporations. 83 "[T]he Model Rules give attorneys substantial latitude since
Rule 1.13 only requires that 'the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary
in the best interest of the organization."' 8 4 Implementation of the Act with Section 307, therefore, will increase the ethical responsibilities and duties of attorneys, 85 and perhaps this will help prevent future corporate scandals.
An argument made in favor of providing rules and requirements for attorneys is that in the Enron and other corporate scandals, some accountants,86
analysts, and traders had lawyers helping them when they broke the law.
These lawyers "structur[ed] bogus deals, vouch[ed] for nonexistent 'sales,'
[and] wr[ote] whitewash reports to keep the sheriff fooled and away."' 87 While
the accountants, analysts, and traders were held accountable, the lawyers seem
to have escaped responsibility for the role that they played in the downfall of
Enron and the other corporations. 88 Law firms did not have to go in front of
Congress and answer questions about their role in the corporate scandal. 89 The
SEC did not appear to launch any investigations into the responsibility of law
The Justice Department eventually stated that it would
firms and attorneys.
announced
scrutinize the conduct of attorneys, but thus far, there has been 9no
1
press.
the
or
Department
Justice
the
from
scrutiny,
this
result from
In order to prevent future corporate scandals such as Enron, it is clear
that some changes are needed. The rules in place before Enron and the other
corporate scandals were not enough. Section 307 holds lawyers accountable for
reporting material violations to directors and boards in hopes that a repeat of
Enron will not occur. Lawyers need to know that they share responsibility in
what happens inside a corporation and that society will hold them accountable
alongside executives, employees, and accountants if they help their clients engage in a cover up of material violations. Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act ensures not only that lawyers cannot actively help corporations engage in
fraudulent practices but also that lawyers cannot close their eyes and pretend
they know nothing - thinking that what they do not see, they do not know, so
they cannot get into trouble. Future corporate attorneys should take a more ac-

83

Id. at 787.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Koniak, supra note 70, at 1237.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

id. at

91

Id.

1238.
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tive role in looking at corporate documents to ensure that a company has not
mismanaged company funds and has not attempted to cover it up.
Some optimists believe if corporations know of the obligations of attorneys under the rules, then the corporations "will be less likely to pursue potentially illegal behavior, knowing that lawyers are ...acting as 'adult supervision."' 9 2 Executives and employees of corporations will know that because of
the new guidelines, attorneys will be held to certain standards and will therefore
take a more active role in corporate matters. This means the executives and
employees will be more likely not to engage in fraudulent practices because they
know attorneys will catch them.
Another argument for providing enforcement for attorneys in the form
of Section 307, is that at this time, "auditors are regulated by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), . . . while securities analysts are
subject to regulation by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)."'93 Traditionally, only state bar
associations have regulated lawyers. "Such guild-like regulation has little incentive to be aggressive, to fund enforcement, or to place the interests of the
public above those of its members." 94 It is believed that Section 307 is needed
as a way to succeed where state bar associations have failed - that is, effectively
regulating attorneys.
In addition, imposing the Section 307 obligations on attorneys "may be
socially desirable." 9 5 It could force corporations and their executives to ask for
advice before action, which will lead them to comply with the law. 96 The goal
is to prevent future Enron occurrences by providing an incentive for corporate
executives to seek advice before they get themselves into trouble, allowing attorneys to provide guidance and advice that will stop corporate fraud before it
starts.
An argument for reporting up is that it will serve as a deterrent. 97 Because "decisions made by one person still need to be implemented by others,"
once a corporate executive or other employee has caused a material violation to
occur, others who are expected to go along with the material violation are likely
to consult an attorney. 98 "[KInowledge that others are necessarily likely to learn
of the original actor's conduct and then to consult with counsel about its legality
92

Frankel, supra note 70.

93

Coffee, Jr., supra note 70, at 1302-03.

94
95

Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1308.

96

Id. (discussing a well-known article by Professors Kaplow and Shavell).

97

Id. "Requiring noisy withdrawals and up-the-ladder reporting also has a deterrent value.

. ."Id.
98
Id.
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may deter the original actor." 99 Even if there is less communication between
employees or executives and attorneys, the knowledge that "sooner or later" the
attorney will find out and that the attorney will be required to report the material
violation (or even the possibility of a material violation) up the ladder should
has also been advanced for
deter some illegal actions. 100 This same argument
10 1
the yet to be adopted noisy withdrawal rule.
Even with all of the benefits that Section 307 can provide, most notably
the overreaching goal of preventing another corporate scandal such as Enron,
there are many who believe that the problems Section 307 will cause outweigh
any benefits that it may bring.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH SECTION

307

For opponents of Section 307, implementation of Section 307 could potentially cause more problems than the Act was created to prevent. While many
problems could occur, one of the main concerns about Section 307 is the effect
that the Section could have on the attorney-client privilege.
The Foundationof the Attorney-ClientRelationship:Attorney-Client
Confidences

A.

In order to better understand the reason for this concern, it is important
to first look at the origination and policy reasons behind the attorney-client
privilege and then move on to consider the possible effects the Section will have
on the privilege.
1.

Creation of Attorney-Client Privilege

"[A]ttorney-client privilege is the oldest evidentiary privilege recognized in Anglo American common law.'1°2 It actually began in Roman law
where the loyalty that the lawyer owed to his client disqualified him from serving as a witness in the client's case.10 3 The privilege and rule of confidentiality
continued in English common law because of the client's right to have his secrets protected. 104 In America, the privilege continued to exist, but its scope and
99

Id.

100

Id. at 1309.

101

Id.

102 Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges:FederalLaw Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on
the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why it is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 474 (2003).
Id.
103
104 Id. at 475.
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breadth were not well defined. 10 5 At first, the only clear thing about the privilegal advice was "'related directly to pendlege was that it was available ' when
6
0
litigation.""
ing or anticipated
As this country's judicial system grew and became more defined, so too
did the attorney-client privilege. The United States Supreme Court and Dean
John Henry Wigmore's treatise on evidence were two influences on American
history that led to the development of the attorney-client privilege as we know it
today. 107
Wigmore's original treatise provided a policy basis for the privilege, as
well as a definition of the privilege, which is now the basis for the current definition of privilege:
(1) Where the legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relevant to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
the legal adviser, (8) except the clidisclosure by himself or by
108
ent waives the protection.
Wigmore identified four elements that must be present in order
to have an attorney-client privilege:
(1) The communication must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed; (2) This element of confidentiality must
be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) The relation must be one which in
the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered;
and (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than09the benefit
1
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
The acceptance of Wigmore's arguments helped to pave the way for attorney110
client privilege in our current legal system.
The second major influence on the development of the attorney-client
privilege was the Supreme Court, 1 1 specifically:
105

id.

106

Id.

107 Id. at475-76.
108 id. at 476 (citing 4 JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2317 (1sted. 1904)).
109

Id. at477 (citing 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2317 (1st ed. 1904)).

110

ld. at478.
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In 1888, the Supreme Court described the policy grounds for
the privilege as 'founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can
only be safely and readily availed of when2 free from consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.' 1
Lance Cole, author of a Villanova Law Review article, believes there are several
important points that are implicit in this Supreme Court decision. 113 First, "laypersons cannot function in our legal system without the expert advice that can
be obtained only from those with special training in law."
The Court also
stated that the judicial system could not function properly if laypersons did not
feel comfortable obtaining the advice of legal experts, because it is the knowledge of the legal experts that keeps the system functioning."15 Finally, laypersons will not seek the advice of legal experts if the system creates obstacles or if
they think
that there will be adverse consequences if they obtain legal coun6
sel.

11

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not limited the privilege to only
criminal cases. In a leading case shaping corporate attorney-client privilege,
Upohn Co. v. United States,117 the Court stated that "full and frank disclosure

by the client is required in order for the attorney effectively to serve the client as
either adviser or advocate." 1 8 The Court found
that the privilege was available
119
to corporate clients as well as to individuals.
This and other decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the attorneyclient privilege helped to lay the foundation for the argument that has arisen
today between proponents and opponents of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 120 The
question is whether the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will erode the
protections afforded to clients - individual and corporate - under the attorneyclient privilege.
III
112

Id.
Id. at 479 (discussing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888)).

113

Id.

114
11

Id. at 479-80.
IS d. at 480.

116

Id.

117

449 U.S. 383 (1981).

118

Cole, supranote 102, at 485. See also id. at 495 n.71.

Id.(citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 396-97 (1981)).
For more information concerning other Supreme Court decisions that affected the attorneyclient privilege, see generally Cole, supranote 102.
19

120
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Attorney-Client Privilege and Section 307

While there are many different sides to the argument over the erosion of
attorney-client privileges by the Act, one group that has fought against the provisions of the Act that affect attorney-client privilege has been the American Bar
bar is to help
Association (ABA). "One important function of the 1organized
2
'
write the ethical rules that govern the legal profession."
In a speech to the Senate before the bill passed, Senator John Edwards
criticized both the SEC and the ABA for failing to address the responsibilities of
corporate attorneys. 122 He believed that the ABA should have taken a leading
and redefining corporate attorney conduct - something they
role in reforming
123
do.
did not
In 1977 and 1997, the ABA performed a review of the ethical rules that
govern the legal profession by setting up commissions. 124 The Kutak Commission was created in 1977, and the second commission, the Ethics 2000 Commission, was formed in 1997.125 It was this latter commission, the Ethics 2000
Commission, that had the chance to take the leading role in reforming and redechange the provifining corporate •attorney conduct,• but it did not significantly
•
126
The legislature
sion of the Model Rules concerning up-the-ladder reporting.
decided to use the Act to take action and2 7make the up-the-ladder reporting rule
go beyond the Model Rule requirements.
Under the Model Rule the lawyer is required to act only if the
violation is likely to cause "substantial injury to the organization." Under the Sarbanes-Oxley a duty to act is triggered by
evidence of any material violation. Under the Model Rules referral to the highest authority is permissive and need be considered only if "warranted by the seriousness of the matter." Under Sarbanes-Oxley referral to higher authority is mandatory in
of a lower-level appropriate response to the evithe absence
28
dence. 1

121

Evan Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 Colun. L. Rev. 1281, 1281

(2003).
122

Wheeler, supra note 33, at 466.

123

Id.

124

Davis, supra note 121, at 1282.

125

Id.

126

Id.at 1287.

127 Id.at 1288.
128 Id.
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The problem with the Act is that it could possibly require the lawyer to
withdraw if the client does not admit to past violations of securities laws for
which it has no reasonable defense. 129 This mandatory withdrawal incriminates
the client, and clients who do not want to confess will most likely not be candid
with their attorneys. 130 Most lawyers would not withdraw under such circumstances if their services had not been used in committing the violation, and if a
lawyer did withdraw, "he or she would be ethically obligated not to disclose the
specific circumstances." 1 31 "Thus the SEC has created a disclosure event that
would not otherwise exist, •and,,132
required
,-, an extent of disclosure that is ethically
impermissible for the lawyer.
The point behind this argument is that the
independence of the bar would be maintained if the Act provided that client
confidences did not have to be disclosed. 133 In his essay on this subject, Evan
Davis, a partner at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, states that he does not
believe that the independence of the bar should be compromised "even for such
an important34purpose as to help public confidence i[n] corporate accounting and
reporting."1
Additional concern about attorney-client privilege can be found in an
Oklahoma Law Review article, Securities Law: Section 307 of the SarbanesOxley Act: Irreconcilable Conflict with the ABA's Model Rules and the Oklahoma Rules of ProfessionalConduct, that states that "a legitimate concern exists

that the SEC rules under section 307 may have a chilling effect on communications between an attorney and the attorney's primary contacts within a represented corporation." 135 The article posits that officers and employees in a corporation will not be as forthcoming about matters pertaining to the corporation
with the attorney if they fear that Section 307 will force attorneys to report everything to a higher corporate authority. 136 This creates a problem because attorneys cannot provide help for corporations and cannot prevent corporate scandals
from occurring if they do not receive complete
and accurate information from
1
3
corporation.
the
within
employees
officers and
Finally, an Alison Frankel article in American Lawyer makes one last
important point about the possibility of Section 307 chilling relationships be129 Id. at 1289.
130

Id. at 1290.

131 Id.
132

Id.

133

Id.

134 Id. at 1292.
135

Wheeler, supra note 33, at 485.

136

Id.

137 Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 16
WEST VIRGINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

tween attorneys and their clients. "[W]e have no idea of how many scandals
didn't happen because a client felt comfortable speaking in absolute candor to a
lawyer, and because the lawyer was able to provide advice without worrying
about his own civil liability." 138 This is an important point to consider, because
it shows that Section 307 could have the opposite effect intended - instead of
preventing scandals, it could create more.
The issue of attorney-client privilege is not the only concern for those
who oppose Section 307. There are many other concerns that together with attorney-client privilege issues give support to the proposition that the Section
may greatly outweigh any potential gain that it may have in preventing corporate scandals.
B.

Problems, Problems, and More Problems: OtherProblems with Section
307

Some critics are concerned that the Section does not provide enough
regulation. For example, one problem with Section 307, as discussed by Susan
P. Koniak, Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law, is that Section
307 does not go far enough; as the amendment went through the government's
rulemaking process, "[t]he SEC retreated." 139 Professor Koniak believes that
the "saga is not yet over... [the] ending leaves lawyers free to continue helping
major corporations deceive
the investing public. The ending guarantees us more
140
Enrons - lots more."
Professor Koniak also finds fault with the trigger for the attorney to report up. 14 1 She believes that the SEC's attempt to clarify the reporting up standard failed. 142 For her, whether the standard is objective or subjective, it is "incomprehensible."' 143 "[W]hat it seems to require for enforcement is proof that a
prudent lawyer would have to have concluded that the law was reasonably likely
to have been violated," 144 which "is equivalent to requiring the agency to show
138

Frankel, supra note 70.

139

Koniak, supranote 70, at 1238.

140

Id.

141

See id. at 1274-75. Under the final rule, a lawyer must report, first to the CEO or the chief

legal officer "credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur." Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities and Exchange Commission, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,
6321 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.2(e)).
142
Koniak, supra note 70, at 1275.
143 Id.
144

Id.
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that the lawyer actually concluded (knew) the law was being violated."' 145 Even
if the confusion over the standard can be resolved, demonstrating what a person
actually knew may be harder to prove than many think, which returns the corporate world to where it was before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act - no rules and no enforcement for the misdeeds of attorneys, other than state imposed rules and
sanctions.
The bottom line for Professor Koniak is that Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an effort to make the SEC hold lawyers accountable. 46 But
not everything is as it seems. "The SEC proposed something that looked tough,
In her view, the SEC's rules are not as tough as they initially set
but wasn't."
out to be and do not hold lawyers as accountable. 48 She concludes by saying,
[with the ABA]
"the SEC says the fight is not over yet. But the first two
149 rounds
before."
here
been
have
We
way.
its
go
didn't
surely
Not everyone believes, as Professor Koniak does, that the SEC rules did
not go far enough. In fact, most believe that the rules went too far, as evidenced
by the amount of material and commentary regarding problems with Section
307 since the SEC's release of both the proposed and final rules. In fact, one
commentator went so far as to say that now, "an attorney representing clients
before the Securities and Exchange Commission also has another title: corporate
snitch." 150 Is that too harsh? Many of those who find problems with the Act
would likely answer no.
In a Continuing Legal Education session sponsored by the Delaware
Valley American Corporate Counsel Association, some lawyers saw the reporting up rule as potentially dangerous because "any lawyer of an outside or inside
firm has potential to go to [the] board of directors or the SEC based on their own
interpretation of the law and facts."' 51 While many material violations may be
discovered this way, false alarms that could potentially damage a corporation's,
a director's, or even an attorney's reputation could also occur.
The session also discussed the noisy withdrawal provision, and because
this provision has been such a problem, the SEC has not yet adopted it. Michael
A. Bloom, a bankruptcy lawyer with Morgan Lewis & Bockius as well as a legal
ethicist, 152 stated:
145
146

Id.
Id. at 1278.

147

Id.

148

See id.

149

Id.

150

Wheeler, supra note 33, at 461.

151

Nann, supra note 6, at 3.

152

Id.
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The noisy withdrawal provision "fundamentally goes against
the grain of everything we were taught in our first-year legal
ethics and responsibility course, where they talked about this
duty of confidence to our client," Bloom said. "Here we are redefining that duty with considerable concern being well articulated by organized bars across the country that this is [a] not
necessary, and [b] not a good thing. 15 3
Furthermore, after considering reporting up and reporting out/noisy
withdrawal, Professor Roberta S. Karmel, Professor of Law at the Brooklyn
Law School, noted that she also sees "a lot of problems with the rule." 154 One
problem is that Section 307 applies to "attorneys acting as attorneys, but it also
155
applies to all other persons within a corporation who happen to be attorneys."'
That means that someone can be in a department that is completely unrelated to
the practice of law, and if that person is an attorney and becomes aware of a
material violation, that person has the same obligations as the corporation's inhouse counsel under the provisions of Section 307.156 This could be problematic in two ways. First, employees in a corporation who are attorneys, even if
they no longer practice law, must become familiar with the regulations and act
accordingly. Not only are they now required to do their job and do the job of
the corporate attorneys, but also some of them may not know that they fall under
the guidelines simply because they hold a law degree. Second, the fact that they
fall under the regulations may deter some attorneys who are considering a career
change from deciding to work in corporations. Who wants to become a corporate attorney when there is the likelihood of having strained relationships with
your clients, your attorney-client privileges may be affected, you have to contend with the possibility of choosing between SEC rules or state rules, and even
if you manage to perform your duties to the best of your ability, there is still a
chance that a material violation can get by you and get you into trouble?
Professor Karmel also believes that the Act "puts into statutory form
two previously controversial proposals: first, it ...give[s] the SEC the authority
to regulate the professional practice of securities attorneys and thereby federalizes the regulation of the bar in certain respects."' 157 "This goes considerably
beyond the securities laws."' 158 Professor Karmel states that this seems to give
the SEC the power to control attorneys who become aware of the material viola153

Id.
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159
tions within the company.
She believes that the SEC is trying to turn lawyers
60
into whistleblowers.1
Another problem she observes is that "[t]he whistle-blowing provisions
...go beyond the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and are contrary to legal
ethics in many states. The SEC intends to determine attorney-client privilege
questions."
This creates a problem in two different areas. First, attorneys
will face conflicting legal ethics rules between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
various states, and the attorneys will have to either make the decision of which
set of ethics to follow or the states may have to change their own ethics rules to
clarify what attorneys must do in certain situations. Second, as discussed previously in supra Part IV(A) of this Comment, the provisions in the SarbanesOxley Act could potentially force attorneys to break attorney-client privileges,
violating an integral part of the American legal system that has been around
since the creation of our judicial system.162
Stuart Kaswell, Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of the Securities Industry Association, 163 seems to agree with Professor Karmel that the
SEC has sought to turn lawyers into cops for the SEC.164 He claims that Congress did not see a whistle-blowing provision, or noisy withdrawal provision, for
that matter, as necessary. 165 Mr. Kaswell cites legislative history to show that
the Act was not meant to change attorney-client privilege. 166 But nevertheless,
the rules seem to do so.

159 Id.
160

Id. at 622.

161 Id. at 623-24.
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See supra notes 102-38 and accompanying text.
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Act of 2002: Panel 2: The Evolution of Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 615. "Formed in
1969, the Security Industry Association (SIA) provides its members with a full-service, international trade association promoting growth, expansion, and professionalism within the security
industry by providing education, research, technical standards, representation, and defense of our
member's interests." Security Industry Association Homepage, Security Industry Association, at
http://www.siaonline.org/page.aspc=welcome&=2 (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
16 The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002: Panel 2: The Evolution of Corporate Governance, supra note 6, at 626 (agreeing
with Professor Karmel that the SEC "saw fit to propose something much further and that is to go.

.to the SEC").
165 Id. at 627.
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Id. See 148 CONG. REC. S6555 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Senator Enzi) (pro-

claiming that the amendment would not require attorneys to report violations to the SEC and
would not empower the SEC to cause attorneys to breach their attorney/client privilege). See

n.52.
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Mr. Kaswell believes that the SEC rules will adversely change the relationship between attorneys and their corporate clients. 67 He thinks that lawyers
will be seen as the enemy - someone from whom to hide secrets. Corporations,
fearing that attorneys will get them into trouble rather than save them from trouble, will be afraid to tell lawyers about any potential problems or material violations. 6 8 Instead of turning to lawyers in times of trouble, corporations will be
turning away from their lawyers, potentially causing the problem to become
much worse than it would have been if the advice of the attorneys had been
sought.
There is no doubt that there are many, many more problems that could
occur, and while this paper does not delve into all of them, some are worth mentioning at least in passing. The Alison Frankel article in the American Lawyer,
published in late 2002, after the release of the proposed rules but before the passage of the SEC's final rules, lists several potential consequences of the attempt
at reform, including "federal incursion into lawyer regulation;" "increased risk
of law firm liability;" and "erosion of client confidence in lawyers."' 16 9 The
article states that the rules have the potential to "turn lawyers into watchdogs
who will have 70to worry about covering their own backs even as they worry
about clients."1
Frankel's American Lawyer article also discusses a very important
point: "The power to regulate lawyers has always rested with states. But if
Congress has empowered the SEC, what's to stop other federal agencies from
asserting regulatory power and enacting rules for lawyers?"'17 1 Frankel gives the
example that a lawyer working on an initial public offering for a telecommunications company may have to "keep in mind the ethical guidelines of the SEC,
Federal Communications Commission, and the state bar."' 172 Frankel believes
that "the potential for confusion is dizzying."' 173 The question is who is in
charge of attorneys? When corporations look to attorneys for guidance, to
whom can the attorneys look?
Frankel agrees with Professor Karmel and Mr. Kaswell that there could
be a potential change in the relationship between lawyers and clients and claims
that there will be more stress placed on the relationships between attorneys and
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corporations. 174 While optimists believe that lawyers may curtail illegal behavior by acting as "adult supervision,"' 175 others think that clients will stop being
honest with their attorneys. 17 This could potentially become a disasterous
situation for attorneys and the SEC; the rules could have the opposite effect of
what the SEC intended. "If clients are worried about consulting their lawyers in
delicate situations, or aren't honest with their lawyers, we could see more illillegal client behavior than before - just the opposite of what
considered or even 77
reformers intend."'
Another potential problem that combines the aforementioned problems
of affecting attorney-client privileges, chilling relationships between attorney
and client, and turning attorneys into cops and whistleblowers, is that Section
307 could force lawyers to become gatekeepers. "The term 'gatekeeper' has
frequently been used to describe the independent professionals who serve inves178
tors by preparing, verifying, or assessing the disclosures that they receive."
Usually, gatekeepers are independent, and if they do not consent to what is
"may be unable to effect some
asked of them by the corporation, the corporation
179
transaction or to maintain some desired status."
There are two main reasons why attorneys did not traditionally assume a
predominant role of gatekeepers before corporate scandals. First, attorneys usually have multiple roles within a corporation: "(1) advocate; (2) transaction engineer; and (3) disclosure supervisor - or gatekeeper," but opponents of the new
rules point out that imposing gatekeeper duties on attorneys "would compromise
the attorney's loyalty to the client, thereby subordinating the attorney's primary
role to the secondary role of gatekeeper." 1 Imposing these duties on attorneys

174

id.

175 Id.
176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Coffee, Jr., supra note 70, at 1296. Examples include:
(1) [T]he auditor who provides its certification that the issuer's financial
statements comply with generally accepted accounting principles; (2) the debt
rating agency that evaluates the issuer's creditworthiness; (3) the securities
analyst who communicates an assessment of the corporation's technology,
competitiveness, or earnings prospects; (4) the investment banker who furnishes its "fairness opinion" as to the pricing of a merger; and (5) the securities attorney for the issuer who delivers an opinion to the underwriters that all
material information of which the attorney is aware concerning the issuer has
been disclosed properly.

Id. at 1296-97.
179 Id. at 1297.
180 Id. at 1302.
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means that attorneys will have to function much like an auditor. 81 That is,
"[they] will have to exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable if [they] [are] also the close counselor of management in other matters,
often including business decisions[;]" "[they] will have to be acutely cognizant
of [their] responsibility to the public who engage in securities transactions that
would never have come about were it not for [their] professional presence[;]"
"[they] will have to adopt the healthy skepticism toward the representation of
management which a good auditor must adopt[;]" and finally, "[they] will have
to do the same182thing the auditor does when confronted with an intransigent client - resign."'
Second, public policy has preferred that communications between the
attorney and client are open and unrestricted in order to ensure that the client
freely communicates with the attorney.183 Imposing gatekeeper obligations on
attorneys may go against public policy and harm attorney-client communica1 84
tions, particularly if the SEC decides to adopt the noisy withdrawal provision.
How different would the rules be if the SEC adopted the noisy withdrawal provision? The difference between what pre-Sarbanes-Oxley law was
versus what the obligations would be if the noisy withdrawal obligation is
adopted is that before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
an attorney arguably could stand aside and not object when the
issuer made a disclosure violation of which the attorney was
aware but did not actively assist. If a noisy withdrawal were
mandated, however, at least some instances would arise in
which the85attorney could not remain passive without violating
1
this rule.
This noisy withdrawal provision is controversial for several reasons, but
the main contention of opponents of this provision is that they fear that implementation of the provision will have an adverse impact on attorney-client privilege and attorney-client confidence. For example, if an attorney must "report
out" and abide by the noisy withdrawal provision, the attorney may potentially
have to reveal conversations between his client and him that would normally be
protected by attorney-client privilege; an attorney will be faced with having to
sever attorney-client privilege to withdraw and report the material violation to
the SEC.
18'

Id.at 1299.

182

Id.

183 Id. at 1302.
194 Id. at 1307.
185

Id. at 1303-04.
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There are additional problems with the noisy withdrawal provision.
First, although an attorney may withdraw from representation of the client, this
does not eliminate the attorney's liability. 186 Attorneys can still be held liable if
it seems that8 the
attorneys have not done enough to ensure compliance with the
7
regulations. 1
Further, the noisy withdrawal option only works when the lawyer's written work product is necessary for the completion of
the business transaction and where the opposing party takes the
hint from the disaffirmance. Finally, where the transaction is a
completed initial public offering, for instance, it is very difficult
to have an effective disaffirmance because investors' decisions
already have been made in reliance on the lawyer's work product. Accordingly, exposure to civil, criminal, and regulatory liability remain under ...the noisy withdrawal option[]. 188
Related to the issue of the noisy withdrawal provision, there is one possible implication that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could have that the SEC and attorneys may not have considered. Even though the final provisions do not require this, the chief legal officer who reports up but "finds management unresponsive to exposure of material wrongdoing
may simply have no practical al189
ternative but to walk out the door."
Mark S. Dodge, General Counsel to Paisano Publications, Inc., shared
his experience with this situation in a Corporate Legal Times article. 190 He
hopes that his story will demonstrate that "the possibility of having to resign
over an ethical conflict is one of the great risks of serving as general counsel. ' 19 1 In 1982, Dodge became general counsel of Financial Corp. of America
(FCA), a NYSE-listed financial services company. 192 When he joined the company, the chairman and CEO was Charles Knapp.1 93 In 1984, the new regulatory leadership forced Knapp out, and when he left, he asked Dodge to help him
186

Lisa H. Nicholson, A Hobson's Choicefor Securities Lawyers in the Post-EnronEnviron-

ment: Striking a Balance Between the Obligation of Client Loyalty and Market Gatekeeper, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 91, 132 (2002).
187 Id.
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Id. at 134.

189 Mark S. Dodge, Do You Have the Guts to Resign?, CoRPoRATE LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 2003, at
68.
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form a private merchant bank called Trafalgar Holdings.194 Dodge accepted the
offer 5and joined Knapp's firm as executive vice president and general coun19
sel.
Over time, it became clear to Dodge that Knapp had some serious character flaws - he had an obsession with showing the business community that he
was "back," he began stretching the truth as a way to secure clients and generate
fees, and he came up with an idea to raise $15 million in a Securities offering to
fund an investment vehicle called Trafalgar Partners. 196 During a vacation,
Dodge decided to resign, but upon returning to work, he discovered that Knapp
planned to get Dennis Holt, a successful businessman, to invest in Trafalgar
the "true situation" at Trafalgar, and Holt
Partners. 197 Dodge explained to Holt
98
decided not to fund the investment.1
Soon after this incident, Dodge was asked to draft the disclosure document for Trafalgar Partners, the private placement memorandum (PPM), and as
he was doing so, he included the "appropriately truthful language about the
company's track record and current financial condition."' 199 Knapp revised the
document, including inaccurate information, and Dodge told him that he would
not "be party to a securities offering document that was, in [his] judgment, ma20 1
' 2' ° ° Knapp ordered him to include his inaccurate language.
terially deceptive.
Dodge resigned on the spot, and to this day, he has never regretted his decision
attorneys. 20 3
to quit. 20 2 He now uses his story as a lesson for other corporate
One could take Mr. Dodge's story further and surmise that these new
regulations may actually deter future attorneys and young attorneys from practicing corporate law because they fear getting caught up in the rules and regulations. It is understandable that many attorneys will be wary of voluntarily engaging in a practice area where they may have to undertake the responsibility
that material violations are corrected. Furthermore, they now know they can be
held liable if they fail to take care of those violations, and then they will probably face the decision of having to possibly betray attorney-client privileges. At
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this point, it is too soon to tell whether this is a realistic concern - one which
could slow the influx of attorneys becoming corporate attorneys.
The bottom line is that there is an important question for everyone - attorneys, corporate executives, Senators, and Congressmen - to consider: Would
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have made any difference in what happened with Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations involved in corporate scandals? 2 0 4 Alison Frankel's American Lawyer article mentioned supra cites Martin Lipton of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, who is sure that the new provisions will not
prevent another corporate scandal. "'The most difficult thing for a lawyer is
having the wrong client,' he says. 'I don't think these new rules will prevent
people who are bent on doing something wrong from achieving it." 205 If the
new rules will not prevent an Enron situation from occurring again, where does
that leave the corporate and investment world?
V. CONCLUSION

Supporters of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act hope to prevent future occurrences of Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate scandals. Critics of the Act
believe that any benefits of Section 307 will be outweighed by the numerous
problems it will cause. Even after an analysis of the possible implications of the
rules, at this time it is still difficult to predict how the Section will affect the
future role of attorneys. Only time will tell whether the Act prevents or causes
more corporate scandals; whether relationships between attorneys and corporations are strained in such a way that executives no longer trust attorneys to advise them for fear of attorneys discovering material violations; whether attorneys will have to sever attorney-client privileges while following the provisions
of Section 307; or whether attorneys will become whistleblowers, cops, and
gatekeepers for the SEC.
Moreover, if the SEC ever adopts the noisy withdrawal provision, the
problems mentioned here may be exacerbated. Mandating a noisy withdrawal/reporting out step may be going too far. Rather, attorneys should report
potential violations up the ladder to the CEO, and then, if necessary, to the
board of directors in order to prevent corporate scandals. Going any further than
these two requirements, such as reporting out to the SEC, or making a noisy
withdrawal, requires further consideration, especially given the possible effects
on the attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client privilege is too important to
the practice of law and clients to be diluted by legislation such as Section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It is not clear that the benefits of such an act would
outweigh the potential costs of betrayal of confidence. It is important that clients feel comfortable revealing information to their attorney, and it is hard for
attorneys to do their job without all of the necessary information.
204

See generally Frankel, supra note 70.
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Furthermore, why should it be the attorney's job to act as a cop, whistieblower, or watchdog for the SEC? An attorney should be diligent in his or
her job, which can include looking closely at all corporate documents and investigating anything that seems out of the ordinary. Making an attorney suspicious
of every document that crosses his or her desk creates problems for both the
attorney and the client. The attorney will waste energy that may be well spent in
other areas looking for material violations that do not exist, and the clientcorporation will feel as if it is being treated as a criminal. In fact, mandating
that an attorney do more than a reasonable diligent job seems to turn the attorney into a prosecutor for the SEC, rather than counsel for the corporation. That
is not the job most corporate attorneys envision when accepting positions as
corporate counsel. Otherwise, they would go to work directly for the SEC.
Perhaps by taking the time to see how the most recent rules affect the
world of corporate attorneys and corporate scandals, it will be easier to see what
the next step should be. Attorneys who fall under the regulations will be the
best judges of how well, or how poorly, Section 307 works. If they believe that
the Section is detrimental to the role that they play in the corporation, then attorneys should reconsider the regulations in place. If, on the other hand, the
regulations do not seem to work and corporations continue to abuse the system,
it may be time to realize that Section 307, and thus, perhaps attorneys, have no
correlation to corporate scandals and enforcement of the Section should be
abandoned. Or it could indicate that it may be time to enforce stricter versions
of the rule, perhaps even adopting a noisy withdrawal provision.
With the corporate scandals and the subsequent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act occurring so recently, it is difficult to predict accurately what
might happen in the future. What can be said, however, is that Section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will affect attorneys, and most likely corporations, both
positively and negatively. The question will be whether the positive effects
outweigh the negative effects. Exactly how it affects the corporate and investment world will surely determine the next step that Congress and the SEC decide to take.
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